We describe a protocol design process, and illustrate its use by creating atspect, an Authentication Test-based Secure Protocol for Electronic Commerce Transactions. The design process is organized around the authentication tests, a method for protocol verification based on the strand space theory. The authentication tests dictate how randomly generated values such as nonces may be combined with encryption to achieve authentication and freshness.
Introduction
In previous work [12, 14, 9] , we have developed a method-called the "authentication test" method-that can be used by hand to verify cryptographic protocols. We also pointed out that the same ideas can be used to guide the protocol development process, quickly leading to new protocols; proofs of correctness for these protocols then follow from the development process. In [12, 14] we illustrated the point by "reinventing" preexisting protocols. The purpose of this paper is to use it to create a completely new protocol with highly non-trivial functionality.
We call our new protocol atspect, an Authentication Test-based Secure Protocol for Electronic Commerce Transactions. It is intended to achieve the essential security goals of the existing Secure Electronic Transaction (set) purchase request, payment authorization, and payment capture phases, as we understand them.
Protocol Goals
The goals of the participants are of four kinds:
Confidentiality, I Data intended only for a pair P, Q of participants is not disclosed to the third participant in the run, or any other principal.
Confidentiality, II Data intended to be shared among the three participants in the exchange is not disclosed to any other principal.
Authentication, I Each participant P should receive a guarantee that each partner Q has received P 's data and Q accepted it.
Non-Repudiation Each participant P should be able to prove the Authentication, I guarantee it has received to a third party.
Authentication, II Each participant Q should receive a guarantee that data purportedly from a partner P in fact originated with P , freshly in a recent run of this protocol.
Three-Party Agreement Suppose that P completes a run apparently with partners Q, R. Then Q and R have begun runs of the protocol, agreeing on the shared data.
Most of these goals concern just a pair P and Q of principals. We want to achieve the goals whichever principals P and Q may be. This observation motivates our design strategy, which treats the protocol as a collection of two party subprotocols (Section 4). When we show that the two-party protocols meet their goals (Section 5.1), we will also be more precise about which keys must be uncompromised to establish each goal. Two of the goals are intrinsically about the interaction of all three parties. One is Confidentiality, II, which concerns the confidentiality of the information shared among all three participants. The other is Three-Party Agreement, which requires that both intended interlocutors have begun runs of the protocol with compatible shared data. The pairwise secret data of the intended interlocutors is not constrained by Three-Party Agreement.
We establish the three-party goals directly for the combined protocol (Section 6.4). They are easily proved given the structure of the three-party protocol, and what is already known about confidentiality and authentication for the twoparty subprotocols. We explain the practical usage of the protocol in somewhat more detail in Section 6.3.
The Authentication Tests
In this section, we will introduce the basic ideas of the strand space theory, and then describe the authentication tests. A more precise summary is in the Appendix.
Strand Spaces
A strand is a sequence of transmission and reception events local to a particular run of a principal. If this principal is honest, it is a regular strand. If it is dishonest, it is a penetrator strand, taking the forms in Definition A. 8 .
A bundle B is a causally well-founded directed graph containing the transmission and reception events of a number of strands. It represents a global execution possible for a given protocol (with a penetrator). A node m in the graph precedes a node n (written m B n) if the n is accessible from m via 0 or more edges of the graph. Likewise, m ≺ B n means it is accessible via 1 or more edges. (See Definition A.5.)
We write S for safe keys, i.e. keys we can prove that the penetrator can never learn. In [14] we show how to define S in a useful way. In our current context, we are interested only in the private members of public-private key pairs. Since private keys are never transmitted in the protocols we will consider, they will belong to S unless compromised before execution of the protocol. Thus, we will not need any elaborate method to prove that a key is in S. If K ∈ S, the penetrator can never use K for encryption or decryption.
The Authentication Test Idea
Suppose a principal in a cryptographic protocol creates and transmits a message containing a new value v, later receiving v back in a different cryptographic context. It can conclude that some principal possessing the relevant key K has received and transformed the message in which v was emitted. If K ∈ S is safe, this principal cannot be the penetrator, but instead must be a regular principal. A transforming edge is the action of changing the cryptographic form in which such a value v occurs. The authentication tests [10, 14, 18] give sufficient conditions for transforming edges being the work of regular principals. There are two main types of authentication test.
Outgoing Tests A uniquely originating value a may be transmitted only in encrypted form {| . . . a . . . |} K where the decryption key K −1 ∈ S is safe. If it is later received outside the context {| . . . a . . . |} K , then a regular participant, not the penetrator, must have been responsible the first time it appears in a different context. We write {| . . . a . . . |} K ; . . . a . . . for a transforming edge that extracts it from this form. This transforming edge occurs after the original transmission of {| . . . a . . . |} K at m 0 and before the transformed version is received back at m 1 , where the temporal relations refer to the ordering B generated by the arrows in the bundle B.
It is an outgoing test because the encrypted unit goes out; see Figure 1 . Figure 1 presents a theorem, Proposition 19 of [14] in simplified form.
Incoming Tests If, instead, a is received in encrypted form {| . . . a . . . |} K although it was not sent in that context, and the encryption key K ∈ S is safe, then a regular participant must have been responsible when a entered this
Assume {|h|}K term(m1) a originates uniquely at m0, a contained only in {|h|}K
Conclude nodes n0, n1 exist in B and are regular {|h|}K t m0 ≺ n0 ≺ n1 ≺ m1
Assume {|h|}K term(m0) a originates uniquely at m0
Conclude nodes n0, n1 exist in B and are regular m0 ≺ n0 ≺ n1 ≺ m1 Figure 2 , representing Proposition 20 of [14] . In public key cryptography, K is serving as a signature key. Sometimes a uniquely originating value a is transmitted in one encrypted form {|h|} K and received back in a different {|h |} K . If K −1 ∈ S and K ∈ S, then this is both an outgoing test and an incoming test. However, these two views may have different consequences. As an outgoing test, it implies a regular transforming edge that accepts {|h|} K and extracts a from it. This may be of some form other than {|h |} K , since another principal may later transform it again. The incoming test yields a transforming edge creating {|h |} K , although it may have received a in a form other than {|h|} K .
Unsolicited Tests A third, related but weaker, type of test is the unsolicited test. If a term {|t|} K is received, and K ∈ S is safe, then {|t|} K originated on some regular strand. After all, it originated somewhere, and that can not have been a penetrator strand if K ∈ S. Here we know only that the regular node originating {|t|} K is before the node on which it is received. We do not know any node after which it must have occurred. We write ; {|t|} K for the positive node that must exist as a result of an unsolicited test.
Summary The authentication tests are summarized in Table 1 . The last column contains × if the first node on the test edge is a lower bound (in the ordering ) constraining when the transforming edge occurs.
We will design atspect so that incoming tests are sufficient to achieve all the authentication properties. A second, alternative justification of the goal Authentication, I uses an outgoing test. An unsolicited test achieves the nonrepudiation goal.
Recency
In [9] we study recency as a means for ensuring that protocols cannot be undermined by key compromise. In the current paper, we use the same notion of recency for a different purpose, namely to ensure that a transaction is not caused by a dishonest party replaying a stale message.
Regular strands provide a way to measure recency. Implementers always ensure that a local protocol run will timeout long before cryptanalysis could have succeeded. Thus, a principal engaged in a strand knows that an event is recent if it happened after an earlier event on the same strand. The incoming and outgoing tests entail recency. That is, if m 0 ⇒ + m 1 is a test edge, and n 0 ; n 1 is the corresponding transforming edge in B, then m 0 ≺ n 0 ≺ n 1 ≺ m 1 , so that n 0 and n 1 are recent for m 1 . By contrast, the unsolicited test establishes nothing about recency. If we assume that each regular strand is implemented so as to time out before the total elapsed time between its first node and last node reaches some bound b, then recency in the sense of Definition 3.1 entails that n happened less than b time units before m 1 .
In some cases, we need a more inclusive, "extension ladder" notion of recency. If n is i-recent for m, then there are i strands, each overlapping a portion of the preceding one. From beginning to end, at most i times b, the time-out bound for a single regular strand, can have elapsed. In the Authentication, II goal of atspect, we will be interested in 2-recency. We will arrange that Q, executing a strand s Q , can be sure that P 's data originated on a strand s P , such that some node of s P comes after some node of s Q . The data may have originated before any node of s Q , but not more than b before.
Authentication Tests and Protocol Design
The authentication tests suggest a protocol design process. At our level of abstraction, authentication protocol design is largely a matter of selecting authentication tests, and constructing a unique regular transforming edge to satisfy each. We will now examine our security goals and consider how to achieve them using authentication tests.
Cryptographic Assumptions We will assume that each principal has two public-private key pairs. In one, the public key is used for encryption and the private key is used for decryption. In the other, the private key is used for signatures, and the public key for verification. We assume that the public keys for any participant can be determined reliably, e.g. via a public key infrastructure. When P is a principal with public encryption key K P , we write {|t|} P to stand for {|t|} K P . Assuming K P is uncompromised (i.e. K −1 P ∈ S), only P can tractably recover t from this encryption.
The encryption may be implemented via familiar mechanisms, such as the following. The sender chooses a temporary symmetric key K, encrypting the payload t with that key; K is transmitted encrypted with the public key of the recipient. Some additional information tying K to t may also be included. Thus, to transmit t securely to P , one transmits {|Kˆ. . . |} K Pˆ{ |t|} K . It would be interesting to develop a general theorem justifying this sort of transformation, particularly in connection with a model of the underlying cryptography [3, 11] .
Likewise, [[ t ] ] P is the result of signing t using P 's private signature key. We assume that only P can tractably construct [[ t ]] P from a new message t.
One other cryptographic-quality primitive is needed, namely a hash function; h(t) is the result of applying the hash function to t. We assume that no principal can tractably find a pair of values t 1 , t 2 such that h(t 1 ) = h(t 2 ), or, given v, can tractably find t such that h(t) = v.
We model the cryptographic operators following Dolev and Yao [6] , as formalized in the strand space theory [21, 14] . We regard hashing as encryption with a key for which no one knows the matching decryption key.
Payloads and Confidentiality
We will not specify the payloads fully. However, we allow one confidential payload to originate at each principal P , intended for each partner Q. We refer to it as sec P.Q , and a goal of the protocol is to provide a confidentiality protection for its contents against any principal other than P, Q. We also allow for a shared payload shared P sent by P to both other principals. Confidentiality of shared P against any principal other than C, M, B is required.
We assume that the identities of the intended principals may be recovered from shared P , as well as other core data about the transaction, via a function core(shared P ). To avoid guessing attacks [16] , some unpredictable value should occur either in shared P or in sec P.Q .
Each principal P , having received shared data from Q and R and having constructed the shared data P it will itself transmit, checks that
Since we expect to implement the confidentiality requirements using public key cryptography, we will need to have P encrypt sec P.Q , together with shared P and possibly other ingredients, using K Q the public key of the recipient Q.
Designing the Two-Party Subprotocols
To simplify our problem, we will regard the full, three-party protocol as being composed out of simpler subprotocols that involve pairs of parties. This is natural because our authentication goals are pairwise goals; we simply want to achieve them for all six ordered pairs of the three principals. Thus, we focus on an arbitrary pair P, Q. When we have seen how to achieve the authentication goals for P, Q in a subprotocol, we will then piece the subprotocols together to form the full protocol (Section 6), there being several ways to do this. Our work on protocol independence [13] will justify the composition.
Figure 3: Edges Achieving Authentication, I
Achieving Authentication, I
Our first authentication goal is the assertion:
P 's data means the two values sec P.Q and shared P , which we know must be transmitted encrypted with Q's public key. The incoming authentication test tells us that one way to ensure this is to prepare a new value N P.Q , transmitting N P.Q with {|sec P.Qˆs hared P |} Q . After receiving and processing this unit, Q returns an authenticating message
Q , which proves that N P.Q reached Q and was accepted as part of a successful strand. We also want to ensure that N P.Q was accompanied by the payloads sec P.Q and shared P when it was processed. Therefore we will require the authenticating message A P.Q to take the form [[ . . .ˆN P.Qˆt ]] Q where t contains the payloads in some form. Specifically, we require that they be decrypted and hashed, so that we have A P.Q = [[ . . .ˆN P.Qˆh (sec P.Qˆs hared P ) ]] Q . We now have the behavior shown in Figure 3 . This is evidently an incoming test assuming that Q's signature key is uncompromised and N P.Q is uniquely originating.
However, the outbound message also contains a uniquely originating value, namely N P.Q , and this value is encrypted with Q's public key. If we assume that Q's decryption key is also uncompromised, then this is also an outgoing test. Only Q can decrypt the payload to extract N P.Q . This is not merely redundant. It may correspond to a meaningful work-flow within the principal Q. For instance, if P = C and Q = M , then the transforming edge for this outgoing test may be performed in the sales department. They check that the customer's order is valid, that the price of each item is correct, and that each item is available in inventory. Then they transfer the order to the accounts receivable department. Accounts receivable prepares the hash h(sec P.Qˆs hared P ), affixes the signature, and executes the rest of the protocol. Although all of these steps occur automatically within the merchant's information systems, they are implemented in a distributed way. The decryption and signature keys may be separately protected on different computer systems maintained by independent parts of the corporation.
The decision to include N P.Q within the encrypted unit, and the decision to hash sec P.Qˆs hared P rather than the encrypted component {| . . .ˆsec P.Qˆs hared P |} Q , is thus motivated by a desire to accommodate separation of duty within enterprises, at least for the case Q = M . Thus, the portion of the protocol represented in Figure 3 ensures that the Authentication, I goal will be met in two separate ways.
Achieving Non-Repudiation
The behavior displayed in Figure 3 also achieves the non-repudiation goal.
Non-Repudiation Each participant P should be able to prove its Authentication, I guarantee to a third party.
If P wishes to hold Q responsible for the transaction, then P can disclose the plain-texts N P.Q , sec P.Q and shared P , together with the signature
This certifies that Q received, processed, and approved the transaction. The certification depends only on the assumption that Q's signature key is uncompromised, as it relies on the unsolicited test that a message of this form can be produced only by Q. Because Q signs the decrypted values sec P.Q and shared P , the principal P must disclose the content of the transaction in order to hold Q responsible. This seems desirable from a business point of view.
Achieving Authentication, II
In order to achieve the second authentication goal, we must extend the protocol.
In particular, it originates at a 2-recent node (Definition 3.2). We enrich the protocol exchange displayed in Figure 3 by having Q emit a uniquely originating value N Q.P . P signs N P.Q , N Q.P , and the hash of the payloads in a recency certificate, taking the form
This transforming edge completes an incoming test for Q, assuming P 's signature key is uncompromised, as shown (right-to-left) in the lower rectangle in Figure 4 . Q knows that this signature was generated after N Q.P was created. Moreover, if P is behaving properly, then this signature is emitted only in a run that also caused the origination of N P.Q . Thus, m 2 is recent for n 2 , and m 0 is recent for m 2 . Therefore, m 0 is 2-recent for n 2 . Q can also use the signed component in the bottom line of Figure 4 as nonrepudiation evidence, to establish the Authentication, II guarantee to a third party. In this case, Q must be willing to disclose the values sec P.Q and shared P .
Distinguishing the Subprotocols
The protocol as described in Figure 4 is a two party protocol between P and Q. We want a three party protocol involving C, M , and B, in which each successively plays the role of P and the role of Q with each of the other principals. We will want to interweave these protocols without undermining the guarantees that each of them would provide if executed purely in isolation.
By [13] , it suffices that no encrypted unit emitted in one subprotocol could have been emitted in any other. One can achieve this by assigning each encrypted component an identifying tag showing to which subprotocol it belongs.
Since the behavior of Figure 4 occurs with any of the principals C, M, B as P and any of other principal as Q, we have six possibilities. We select, then, six distinct constants c 1 , . . . , c 6 , which we refer to as C.M, C.B, etc. Here we do not intend C, M, and B as names for particular principals, but as constants referring to the three roles. We use the sans serif font to emphasize that they are constants, not variables referring to the identities of the participants. Even if the same participant plays multiple roles in a single protocol run, these constants distinguish which message component is sent as part of which role.
We will also include a constant distinguishing the messages; although this is strictly unnecessary, it may ease understanding. We will use S in message 1, indicating its role in achieving secrecy; we will use A in message 2, indicating its role in achieving the first authentication goal; and we will use R in message 3, indicating its role in achieving the recency guarantee.
Each subprotocol, involving roles P and Q, takes the form shown in Figure 5 . We refer to an individual subprotocol as atspect P.Q , and we refer to the union of all strands containing behaviors according to any of the six subprotocols as atspect
† . An initiator strand is one taking the form shown in the left column of Figure 5 , and a responder strand takes the form shown in the right Figure 5 : Subprotocol P.Q column of Figure 5 . The parameters of an initiator or responder strand are the variables P, Q (representing the identities of the participants), N P.Q , N Q.P (their respective nonces), and sec P.Q and shared P (the secret and shared payloads).
Correctness
We address the correctness of the individual subprotocols first, and then make sure that they remain correct even when all are executed by the same principals over the same network.
Correctness of the Subprotocols
Let us focus on subprotocol atspect P.Q as defined in Figure 5 . We identified six goals, of which four are essentially two-party goals. We will now formulate each of those as a theorem about the protocol atspect P.Q . We let B be a bundle in which the regular participants execute strands of atspect P.Q . Recall from Section 3.1 that if a key K is safe in B (written K ∈ S), then the penetrator can never use K for encryption or decryption. In this section, italics letters such as P and Q are variables over principals, while sans serif letters such as P.Q refer to a constant such as C.M, which labels one particular subprotocol.
Proposition 5.1 (Confidentiality, I)
Suppose that B is a atspect P.Qbundle in which Q's private decryption key is safe, and suppose B has an Initstrand Init[P, Q, N P.Q , N Q.P , sec P.Q , shared P ].
If sec P.Q is uniquely originating, then there is no node n ∈ B such that term(n) = sec P.Q .
Proof. Let κ be the set of inverses of unsafe keys, i.e. (K \ S) −1 . Let τ be {sec P.Q } ∪ S. By the honest ideal theorem, [21, Corollary 6.12], if there is a node m ∈ B with term(m) ∈ I κ [τ ], then there a regular node n that is an entry point for I κ [τ ]. However, inspecting the positive regular nodes of atspect P.Q , we see that no value in τ is ever sent, unless protected by a key whose inverse is safe.
Assuming that sec P.Q is uniquely originating is essentially a way of assuming that no one guesses this value, and the theorem states that no one can discover it without guessing correctly. If the values sec P.Q and shared P are predictable, then someone may guess correctly. This would be unfortunate, because the protocol transmits h(sec P.Qˆs hared P ), and this confirms a correct guess. That is why we insert some unpredictable ingredient into either sec P.Q or shared P .
The Confidentiality, II goal of secrecy for shared P is a property of the composite protocol, as it is transmitted in more than one subprotocol. We will prove this in Section 6.4. In the remaining propositions, we use the notion of the B-height of a strand (Definition A.4); the B-height of a strand s is the number of nodes of s contained in B.
Proposition 5.2 (Authentication, I)
Suppose that B is an atspect P.Qbundle in which Q's private signature key K is safe, and suppose B has an initiator strand Init[P, Q, N P.Q , N Q.P , sec P.Q , shared P ] of B-height at least 2. If N P.Q is uniquely originating, then B has a matching responder strand Resp[P, Q, N P.Q , X, sec P.Q , shared P ] of B-height at least 2 (for some X).
Proof. Apply the inbound authentication test, given that K ∈ S and N P.Q is uniquely originating. The only transforming edge producing
is the first edge of a responder strand Resp[P, Q, N P.Q , X, sec P.Q , shared P ]. Because P does not occur explicitly in the initiator's message, the claim that the first parameter to the responder strand is P relies on the assumption that core(shared P ) determines that the initiator is P (Section 4.1).
This proposition depends only on Q's signature key being safe, and the nonrepudiation guarantee derives from this. P need not establish that it has behaved honestly, nor that he generated N P.Q in such a way as to make it originate uniquely.
Proposition 5.3 (Non-Repudiation)
Suppose that B is a atspect P.Qbundle in which Q's private signature key K is safe, and suppose there exists a node n ∈ B such that [[ c iˆAˆNP.Qˆh (sec P.Qˆs hared P ) ]] Q term(n). Then there is a responder strand Resp[P, Q, N P.Q , X, sec P.Q , shared P ] of B-height at least 2 (for some X).
Proof. Immediate consequence of the unsolicited test principle, together with the observation that no other strand emits a term with any subterm of the form [[ c iˆAˆNP.Qˆh (sec P.Qˆs hared P ) ]] Q .
Proposition 5.4 (Authentication, II)
Suppose that B is a atspect P.Q bundle in which P 's private signature key K is safe, and
has B-height 3. Then there exists s ∈ Init[P, Q, N P.Q , N Q.P , sec P.Q , shared P ] with B-height 3, and s , 1 is 2-recent for s, 2 .
Proof. The existence of the originator strand s follows immediately from the inbound authentication test principle. Moreover, by the inbound authentication test recency guarantee, s, 2 ≺ s , 2 . Thus, the node s , 1 , where N P.Q , sec P.Q , and shared P originate, is 2-recent for s, 2 .
We have now established the security goals of atspect, as holding of the individual subprotocols atspect P.Q , except the secrecy property for shared P.Q .
Independence of the Subprotocols
A primary protocol Σ 1 is independent of other protocols (jointly called the secondary protocol Σ 2 ) if the question whether the primary protocol achieves a security goal never depends on whether that secondary protocol is in use. In [13] we prove that the independence of Σ 1 from Σ 2 follows from "disjoint encryption." This condition has a somewhat technical definition to allow public key certificates or Kerberos-style tickets to be created in Σ 1 and consumed in Σ 2 . However, a simple sufficient condition is "strongly disjoint encryption:" A primary protocol Σ 1 and secondary protocol Σ 2 have strongly disjoint encryption if, whenever n 1 is a node on some strand of Σ 1 , n 2 is a node on some strand of Σ 2 , and {|h|} K (n 1 ), then {|h|} K (n 2 ). This is exactly why we included the constants c 1 , . . . , c 6 , which we write as C.M, etc. Let Σ 1 be atspect P.Q , and letting Σ 2 be all strands of the protocols atspect P .Q , where P = P or Q = Q. If {|h|} K is sent or received on a strand of Σ 1 , then h begins with the constant P.Q. If {|h |} K is sent or received on a strand of Σ 1 , then h begins with the constant P .Q , which is different from P.Q. Therefore {|h|} K = {|h |} K .
Thus, if atspect P.Q achieves a security goal in isolation, it achieves the same goal when run together with all of the protocols atspect P .Q . We call the union of all these protocols atspect † , so we have concluded that atspect † achieves the goals of the individual protocols atspect P.Q . 
A Three Party Protocol
At this stage, we need only design the message structure of the combined, three party protocol. There are numerous possibilities here. For instance, in theory the principals C, M , and B could simply asynchronously engage in atspect † , i.e. in interleaved runs of the six subprotocols. This would not be incorrect, but it would be rather anarchic, and unlikely to complete transactions promptly.
Instead, we will construct a more structured way of interweaving the protocols. We seek to achieve two goals in doing so. One is the confidentiality for the shared message ingredients shared P , Confidentiality, II. The other is Three-Party Agreement Suppose that P completes a run of atspect with apparent interlocutors Q and R. Then Q and R have begun runs of atspect with core(shared P ) = core(shared Q ) = core(shared R ).
In some sense the collection of two-party protocols atspect † contains the essence of our protocol; atspect adds only a convenient temporal ordering for the subprotocols, with the added constraint that Three-Party Agreement holds of this ordering. Alternate orderings could also serve as well.
A Triangular Message Structure
The first ordering we will present has the message structure shown in Figure 6 . The seven messages flow around a triangle. C, who initiates the exchange, sends three messages, and the other principals each send two. The sequence of events is determined by three principles:
1. C begins the exchange with C.M and C.B. M and B begin their subprotocols on receiving messages from C and M respectively.
2. Each principal, on receiving a component intended for it in a subprotocol, constructs and transmits the next component in that subprotocol.
3. Each principal, receiving a component not intended for it, forwards it to the next principal.
Since some shorthand is useful, we will refer to the message components in the following way:
S P.Q Payload-bearing units, taking the form {|P.QˆSˆN P.Qˆs ec P.Qˆs hared P |} Q
The subscript P.Q indicates that this component is prepared by P for Q's consumption.
A P.Q Authenticators, taking the form
where the subscript P.Q indicates that it authenticates Q's receipt of S P.Q .
R P.Q Recency confirmations, taking the form
where the subscript P.Q indicates that P vouches that it has freshly generated N P.Q , and has received S Q.P and A P.Q .
Using the three principles for ordering message components, we derive the message sequence shown in Figure 7 . Each message consists of three portions, containing zero or more payload-bearing units, followed by zero or more authenticators and zero or more recency confirmations. In early messages, payloads predominate, while progressively authenticators and finally recency confirmations emerge. We require each principal to check that its shared data agrees with the shared data sent by the others. In M 's case (e.g.), this means that shared C , as extracted from S C.M , matches shared B , as extracted from S B.M , both of which match the value shared M as transmitted by M . B makes this check before sending message 3; C, before sending message 4; and M , before sending message 5. They refuse to continue the protocol by sending new authenticators or recency components if this check fails. Observe that P prepares components that will be received by both interlocutors after making this check; for instance, M transmits R M.B and R M.C in message 5. Thus, when B receives R M.B , it gives conclusive evidence that M 's check succeeded. This protocol requires the party playing a role P to generate four nonces, two within the secrecy units S P.Q and S P.R and two within the authenticators A Q.P and A R.P . If we choose four distinct string constants s 1 , . . . , s 4 , then we can generate all four nonces from a single random value N of reasonable length, using the four hashed values h(Nˆs i ). 
A Straightened Version
The triangular message flow has a disadvantage from the implementer's point of view: it does not match smoothly with the normal conventions of programming with TCP/IP and the standard socket library. To solve this problem, we can revise the message flow, adapting it to use eight messages:
This has the advantage that it may be implemented using a pair of socket connections, one between C and M , and one between M and B. There are two disadvantages to this alternative, first, the extra message, and second, that M controls all communication between C and B, which occurs only when M forwards components. We regard the triangular protocol of Section 6.1 as the authoritative version of atspect, although the straightened eight-message version achieves the same protocol goals.
In practice, it may be unnecessary to use all six subprotocols. For instance, the subprotocols C.M, C.B, and M.B may suffice. In this case, we may want to augment the authenticator with some additional payload of information to be communicated back from responder to initiator. Truncated message flows may be based either on the triangular scheme or the straightened scheme. A truncated message flow based on the triangular scheme is displayed in Figure 8 .
ATSPECT Protocol Usage
atspect can be used in various ways, with differing interpretations of the individual messages and differing actions accompanying the protocol steps. We will illustrate the workings of the protocol in a specific scenario, focusing on The crucial extra-protocol action is for B to transfer funds into M 's account, debiting C. In a normal run, this occurs after B receives Message 5. B's Authentication, II guarantees then allow it to justify the transfer if challenged by C or by a regulatory authority.
What should happen if one of the participants interrupts execution part-way through a run? As we mentioned at the beginning of Section 2, this protocol is not intended to achieve fairness, so fully acceptable answers may not exist if execution is interrupted at certain stages. However, if C presents B with the authenticators A C.M and A C.B , confirming that both other participants have accepted C's proposal, then B should effect the funds transfer and require M to provide evidence that the goods have been shipped (possibly after some delay to restock inventory). If M presents B with a recency certificate R C.M , and evidence that the goods have been shipped, then B should effect the transfer to M . A careful treatment of this supplementary protocol would define a message format, signed by C or M respectively, to deliver these payloads.
Why are these resolution procedures reasonable? If C possesses the authenticators A C.M and A C.B , then the Authentication, I guarantees for the C.M and C.B subprotocols imply that M and B have executed the first two nodes of runs matching C's. Thus, it is reasonable to require M to make the shipment when the funds are delivered. Likewise, if M possesses a recency certificate R C.M , then his Authentication, II guarantee implies that C has completed a strand requesting this merchandise. Moreover, C's Authentication, I guarantee and M 's Authentication, II guarantee together ensure that if either of them choose nonces with a high degree of randomness, then these two strands are at worst 2-recent for each other. Evidence that the goods have been shipped should entitle the merchant to be paid.
Turning to the full message flow defined in Figure 7 , we have more opportunities for the participants to negotiate terms within the framework of the protocol. For instance, atspect M.C can be used to propose and accept a shipping schedule, and atspect M.B can be used to propose and accept a transaction fee between M and B. Again, in this version of the protocol, the crucial event is Message 5. When B receives this message, it possesses Authentication, II guarantees for runs of atspect C.B and atspect M.B , so that recent executions by C and M are occurring. Thus, B is now justified in transferring the funds.
ATSPECT's Three-Party Goals
We turn now to the last correctness concerns, whether atspect achieves confidentiality for shared P and the Three-Party Agreement goal.
Proposition 6.1 (Confidentiality, II) Suppose B is a bundle in which P completes a run of atspect with interlocutors Q and R, using shared component shared P , and all three principals have safe private decryption keys.
If shared P is uniquely originating, then there is no node n ∈ B such that term(n) = shared P .
Proof. Apply the honest ideal theorem to κ = (K\S)
−1 and τ = {shared P }∪S, to infer that I κ [τ ] has only regular entry points. But all regular nodes transmit shared P encrypted with a key whose inverse is safe.
Proposition 6.2 (Three-Party Agreement)
Suppose B is a bundle in which P completes a run of atspect with interlocutors Q and R, using shared component shared P . Then if Q's signature key is safe, Q has begun a run of atspect with P and R, with shared components shared Q and shared R , and core(shared P ) = core(shared Q ) = core(shared R ).
Proof. Q transmits either A P.Q or R P.Q after receiving both S P.Q and S R.Q ; it therefore guarantees to P that the shared values in these components match (Section 6.1). P does not transmit its last message until after P has received this guarantee from Q.
Moreover, P has received S R.Q and has the shared value matches shared Q as contained in S Q.P and shared P as P transmitted it in S P.Q and S P.R . shared Q as transmitted in S Q.R matches because Q is assumed uncompromised. Thus, all six values match.
Related Work
Woo and Lam's 1994 paper on protocol design [23] diagnosed the faulty design process leading to a protocol in an earlier paper [22] . They focused on how to safely remove information from a "full information" but inefficient version of a protocol to a less cluttered version. There are two limitations to their approach. First, no guidance is given about how to construct a full information protocol to achieve given goals, especially if these goals are complex, as in atspect. Second, the criteria for safely removing information seem fragile. One might well wonder whether they are always valid, or whether there are ambiguities in how to apply them.
Buttyan et al. [4] describe a BAN-style logic that they say motivates a design method, but it seems hard to abstract the method from the example they give.
Perrig and Song's automated protocol generator APG [18] uses heuristics related to ours to generate plausible candidate protocols. APG then calls Athena [20] to use the strand space model to filter protocols, retaining those proved to meet their specifications. APG does not, however, capitalize on protocol independence to decompose the design process and to synthesize protocols from two-party subprotocols.
The bulk of work on protocol design seems to rely on the skill and ingenuity of the designer. Notable here is Abadi and Needham [1] , which contains a wealth of information about cryptographic protocols, what makes them correct, and how to design them so that they will be. However, they make no claim to be systematic, nor do they base their advice on a theory of protocol goals and correctness.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have illustrated a protocol design methodology, based on the authentication tests. The method has led to a protocol, atspect, that demonstrably meets precisely stated security goals. The atspect design process required less than three weeks of labor, by contrast with the major effort invested in set. atspect appears to provide security guarantees similar to those of set.
The design process has the following steps:
1. Formulate a number of precise goals that the protocol is intended to meet, such as those of Section 2.2. Goals that concern a subset of the principals may be achieved using subprotocols involving only those principals.
2. For each goal, select an authentication test pattern to use to achieve it, and design a transforming edge that will satisfy this authentication goal but no other, as in Section 4.2.1. Verify the subprotocols achieve the individual goals (Section 5.1). Use disjoint encryption to ensure that subprotocols are independent (Section 5.2).
3. Piece the subprotocols together to construct a single protocol as illustrated in Sections 6.1-6.2, and justified in Section 6.4. There is freedom in choosing the combination, allowing trade-offs in number of messages and in communication pattern.
More refined methods may improve the last step, in which the subprotocols are combined, by indicating encrypted components that can be merged or simplified (cp. [17] for transformations on concatenated submessages). Our protocol design method shows how to construct special-purpose protocols for specific situations in secure communication or electronic commerce. It allows us to meet varied trust objectives with a conceptual toolkit justified by strand spaces and the authentication tests.
By abuse of language, we often treat signed terms as ordinary terms. We represent strand spaces by their underlying set of strands Σ.
C is acyclic.
In conditions 2 and 3, it follows that n 1 ∈ N C , because C is a graph.
Definition A.4 A node n is in a bundle C = N C , → C ∪ ⇒ C , written n ∈ C, if n ∈ N C ; a strand s is in C if all of its nodes are in N C . The C-height of a strand s is the largest i such that s, i ∈ C.
Definition A.5 If S is a set of edges, i.e. S ⊂→ ∪ ⇒, then ≺ S is the transitive closure of S, and S is the reflexive, transitive closure of S. Proposition A.6 Suppose C is a bundle. Then C is a partial order, i.e. a reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive relation. Every non-empty subset of the nodes in C has C -minimal members.
We regard C as expressing causal precedence, because n ≺ S n holds only when n's occurrence causally contributes to the occurrence of n . When a bundle C is understood, we will simply write . Similarly, "minimal" will mean C -minimal.
A.3 Terms, Encryption, and Freeness
We specialize the set of terms A, assuming given:
• A set T ⊆ A of texts (i.e. atomic messages).
• A set K ⊆ A of cryptographic keys disjoint from T, equipped with a unary operator inv : K → K. We assume that inv is an inverse mapping each member of a key pair for an asymmetric cryptosystem to the other, and each symmetric key to itself.
• Two binary operators encr : K × A → A and join : A × A → A.
We follow custom and write inv(K) as K −1 , encr(K, m) as {|m|} K , and join(a, b) as aˆb.
We assume that A is freely generated.
Axiom 1 A is freely generated from T and K by encr and join.
Definition A.7 The subterm relation is defined inductively, as the smallest relation such that a a; a {|g|} K if a g; and a gˆh if a g or a h.
By this definition, for K ∈ K, we have K {|g|} K only if K g already.
A.4 Penetrator Strands
The atomic actions available to the penetrator are encoded in a set of penetrator traces. They summarize his ability to discard messages, generate well known messages, piece messages together, and apply cryptographic operations using keys that become available to him. A protocol attack typically requires hooking together several of these atomic actions.
The actions available to the penetrator are relative to the set of keys that the penetrator knows initially. We encode this in a parameter, the set of penetrator keys K P .
Definition A.8 A penetrator trace relative to K P is one of the following:
M t Text message: +t where t ∈ T.
K K Key: +K where K ∈ K P .
C g,h Concatenation: −g, −h, +gˆh S g,h Separation: −gˆh, +g, +h
P Σ is the set of all strands s ∈ Σ such that tr(s) is a penetrator trace.
A strand s ∈ Σ is a penetrator strand if it belongs to P Σ , and a node is a penetrator node if the strand it lies on is a penetrator strand. Otherwise we will call it a non-penetrator or regular strand or node. A node n is M, C, etc. node if n lies on a penetrator strand with a trace of kind M, C, etc.
